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Bernard Chao
ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court’s latest pronouncements on patentable
subject matter in Mayo v. Prometheus have already created a firestorm of
controversy. The Court found that various limitations did not add enough to
the law of nature that lies at the heart of Prometheus’ medical diagnostic
patents to render the claims patent eligible. Because the Supreme Court
never explained what “enough” is, critics have been quick to deride Mayo
and warn that it would radically limit patent eligibility in a wide-ranging
number of industries. Although I agree with the ultimate result reached by
the Supreme Court, I am also concerned that its reasoning unnecessarily
jeopardizes too many deserving patents. But the decision does not have to
create the havoc that so many fear. There is room for a more restrained
understanding of Mayo.
This Essay offers a moderate interpretation of Mayo by building on
recent efforts to revive the out-of-favor “point-of- novelty” analysis. For
years, patent law has refused to consider an invention’s point of novelty in
its decisionmaking. In other words, the law does not attribute any special
significance to a subset of claim limitations regardless of how important
those limitations are to the invention; patent law treats all the limitations as
equally important. However, it makes no sense for patent law to take such a
formalistic approach and ignore the fundamental idea underlying a patent’s
invention. Fortunately, the Mayo decision implicitly adopts some point-ofnovelty thinking. This Essay builds on these ideas to develop a fuller pointof-novelty framework that explains when a claim has added enough to an
unpatentable concept to make it patent eligible. By applying this approach
to both Prometheus’ claims and a hypothetical claim that Prometheus could
have drafted, this Essay explains how Mayo can be interpreted as only a
modest rejection of a particular type of abstract claim.
AUTHOR—Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of
Law. I would like to thank Mark Lemley, Viva Moffat, Christopher
Holman, Justin Pidot, Nancy Leong, Birgit Millauer, Ted Sichelman, and
Michael Risch for their help with this Essay.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent law has long held that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas are not patentable. At the same time, many patents cover
applications that grow out of these fundamental concepts. Courts have
recognized that such applications are patentable. Observers had hoped that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo v. Prometheus would illuminate the
line between unpatentable concepts and patentable applications of those
concepts. Unfortunately, the recent decision issued by the Supreme Court
raises more questions than it answers.1 Although the Court gave a variety of
reasons to explain why Prometheus Laboratories’ (Prometheus) patents
were not patent eligible, the Court’s primary rationale involved dissecting
Prometheus’ claim. The Court found that the limitations did not add
“enough” to the law of nature that lies at the heart of Prometheus’
invention.
Because the Court never explained what “enough” is, critics have been
quick to deride Mayo.2 One commentator went so far as to say that the
decision “creates a framework for patent eligibility in which almost any

1

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
Michael Risch, Patentable Subject Matter, the Supreme Court, and Me, MADISONIAN.NET (Mar.
20,
2012),
http://madisonian.net/2012/03/20/patentable-subject-matter-the-supreme-court-and-me/
(complaining about how difficult it will be to determine what detail needs to be added); see also Ryan
Chirnomas, Supreme Court Strikes Down Diagnostic Method Claims as Non-Patent-Eligible Subject
Matter, CAFC BLOG (Mar. 20, 2012), http://whda.com/cafc/2012/03/20/supreme-court-strikes-downdiagnostic-method-claims-as-non-patent-eligible-subject-matter/ (“[T]his decision is deeply disturbing
to many patent practitioners as well as those in the diagnostics industry.”); Gene Quinn, Killing
Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v. Prometheus, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 20, 2012, 1:44 PM),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/20/supreme-court-mayo-v-prometheus/id=22920/ (“The sky is
falling! . . . Those in the biotech, medical diagnostics and pharmaceutical industries have just been taken
out behind the woodshed and summarily executed . . . .”).
2
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method claim can be invalidated.”3 Although I agree with the Supreme
Court’s ultimate decision, I am also concerned that its reasoning
unnecessarily jeopardizes many deserving patents that have not previously
been thought to have any vulnerability under 35 U.S.C. § 101—the federal
patent statute that defines what types of subject matter may be patented.4 By
failing to provide a framework for determining when additional limitations
can change an unpatentable concept into a patentable application, the
Supreme Court has cast doubt on a host of less controversial patents. But
the decision does not have to wreak the havoc that many fear it will. There
is room for a more restrained understanding of Mayo.
This Essay rehabilitates the decision in Mayo by building on recent
efforts to revive the out-of-favor “point-of-novelty” analysis. A patent’s
point of novelty is the claim limitation or limitations that correspond to the
heart or gist of the invention.5 For years, patent law has refused to consider
an invention’s point of novelty in its decisionmaking. In other words, the
law does not attribute any special significance to a subset of claim
limitations regardless of how important those limitations are to the
invention; patent law treats all limitations as equally important. Recently,
Professor Mark Lemley and I have separately criticized the failure to
consider the point of novelty in a wide-ranging number of doctrines.6
Lemley succinctly summarized the problem in the Northwestern University
Law Review when he asserted that “[i]t makes little sense for a law focused
on invention to pay no attention to what is inventive about the patentee’s
technology.”7
Interestingly, the Mayo decision implicitly uses point-of-novelty
thinking, but its ideas are underdeveloped. This Essay relies on the Court’s
ideas to create a fuller point-of-novelty framework for patentable subject
matter. This framework creates a clearer boundary that separates claims that
cover unpatentable concepts—like Prometheus’ claim—from claims
directed at patentable applications of those concepts. Under such a
3

Robert R. Sachs, Punishing Prometheus: The Supreme Court’s Blunders in Mayo v. Prometheus,
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 26, 2012, 9:10 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/punishingprometheus-the-supreme-courts-blunders-in-mayo-v-prometheus.html. But see Chris Holman, Mayo v.
Prometheus: Analysis and Implications of an Important Supreme Court Decision, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH
IP BLOG (Mar. 21, 2012, 5:20 PM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/prometheus-vmayo-analysis-and.html (“[I]mplemented literally, [the Mayo decision] would seem to deny patent
protection to much of biotechnology . . . . However, I think in practice the lower courts will attempt to
limit the impact of the decision, and find ways to maintain patent eligibility for drug methods of
treatment . . . .”).
4
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
5
A patent’s claims define the scope of the patentee’s property rights. Each claim is made up of a
number of separate limitations. To fall within a claim, each of those limitations must be present.
6
See Bernard Chao, Breaking Aro’s Commandment: Recognizing that Inventions Have Heart,
20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1183 (2010); Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty,
105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2011).
7
Lemley, supra note 6, at 1274–75.
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framework, courts would first examine the limitation that embodies the
point of novelty to determine whether it describes an unpatentable concept.
If it does, the law should then determine whether the other limitations can
bring the principle into the realm of patentable subject matter. That occurs
when the other limitations are both concrete and strongly connected to the
point of novelty. However, if the other limitations do not satisfy these
requirements, the claim is not patent eligible.
Finally, this Essay applies the proposed framework to Prometheus’
claims and confirms that they are not patent eligible. It then applies the
same approach to a claim that Prometheus could have drafted. Under the
point-of-novelty analysis, this hypothetical claim turns out to be patentable.
This result demonstrates how Mayo can be interpreted and applied in the
future as only a modest rejection of a particular type of abstract claim.
I. THE TENSION IN PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Section 101 of the Patent Act broadly defines patentable subject matter
as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”8 Although the
legislative history of the Patent Act suggested that “anything under the sun
that is made by man” is patent eligible, the courts have created exceptions.9
Laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not eligible to
be patented.10 But an invention is not unpatentable simply because it
contains one of these unpatentable concepts.11 “[A]n application of a law of
nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be
deserving of patent protection.”12 Courts have had difficulty determining
when a patent is drawn to one of these unpatentable concepts as opposed to
a patentable application. That is because the Supreme Court has never
provided a framework for determining when additional limitations change
an unpatentable idea into a patentable application.
The Supreme Court unsuccessfully attempted to provide guidance on
this issue less than two years ago in Bilski v. Kappos.13 In that case, the
Federal Circuit had ruled that the machine-or-transformation test was the
sole test for determining the patentability of a “process” under § 101.14 In
other words, a process was only patentable if it was tied to a particular
machine or transformed an article to another state. The Supreme Court
8

§ 101.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citation and internal quotation mark omitted).
10
Id.; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (saying that a mathematical expression
is simply a “scientific truth” and unpatentable (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306
U.S. 86, 94 (1939))).
11
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
12
Id. (emphasis omitted).
13
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
14
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
9
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decision modified that holding, finding that the “test may be a useful and
important clue or investigative tool,” but “it is not the sole test for deciding
whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process’ under § 101.”15
Unfortunately, the Court did not identify other tests that should be used, and
the lower courts continue to rely on the machine-or-transformation test
while rotely noting that it is not the only test.16
II. MAYO V. PROMETHEUS
The Supreme Court took up the issue of subject matter patentability
again in Mayo v. Prometheus. The patents at issue related to medical
diagnostic methods. Synthetic thiopurine compounds have been used to
treat various immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorders. Because everyone
metabolizes thiopurines differently, calculating the correct dose had proven
to be difficult. The inventors of Prometheus’ patents discovered a specific
correlation between the levels of metabolized drug in the body and the
optimal drug dosage. They received two U.S. patents, Nos. 6,355,623 (the
’623 patent) and 6,680,302 (the ’302 patent). The patents differ in some
respects, but all the claims describe multistep processes that use metabolite
measurements to help calculate optimal drug doses. Claim 1 of the ’623
patent is representative. It recites:
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immunemediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red
blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug
subsequently administered to said subject and
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108
red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug
subsequently administered to said subject.17

At first blush, Prometheus’ claims appear quite unusual. The inventors
discovered a correlation between the level of 6-thioguanine metabolite in
the blood and the optimal drug dose, yet their claims do not contain the step
15

Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221.
Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted M. Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2011) (“[T]he U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), patent litigants,
and district courts have all continued to rely on the machine-or-transformation test in the wake of Bilski:
no longer as the sole rule, but as a presumptive starting point that threatens to become effectively
mandatory.”).
17
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999) (emphasis added). Some claims from Prometheus’
patents do not include the first administering step.
16
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of adjusting the drug dosage. Instead, claim 1 contains two “wherein”
clauses that say that a particular metabolite level “indicates a need” to
increase or decrease the dose. As written, claim 1 therefore appears to seek
a patent for an unpatentable law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract
idea rather than a patentable application. The district court, however,
construed claim 1’s “indicates a need” language to cover instances in which
a doctor is warned that an adjustment in dosage may be required.18 So long
as the warning takes place, there can be infringement even when a doctor
does not adjust the dose or adjusts the dose by relying on different
parameters. Thus, by including the “wherein” limitations instead of the
expected “adjusting step” limitations, Prometheus was able to significantly
expand the scope of its patents.
When Mayo Medical Laboratories (Mayo Labs)—a laboratory
operated by the Mayo Clinic—announced that it would offer a thiopurine
metabolite test to compete with Prometheus’ test, Prometheus immediately
sued for patent infringement. Mayo Labs moved for summary judgment,
asserting that the claims from Prometheus’ patents were not patent eligible
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court granted the motion, finding that
the claims recite correlations between thiopurine drug metabolite levels and
therapeutic efficacy or toxicity that are natural phenomena.19 Applying the
machine-or-transformation test, the Federal Circuit reversed that decision.20
The Federal Circuit found that the administering and determining steps
result in transformations of the human body.21 Moreover, the claimed “steps
involve a particular application of the natural correlations: the treatment of
a specific disease by administering specific drugs and measuring specific
metabolites.”22 Consequently, the Federal Circuit concluded that
Prometheus’ claims were properly drawn to patentable subject matter.
On March 20, 2012, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit
and found that Prometheus’ patents were not patent eligible. The Supreme
Court explicitly discussed the distinction between an unpatentable law of
nature and a patent-eligible application of such a law. The Court first noted
that “Prometheus’ patents set forth laws of nature—namely, relationships
between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the
18

Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200 JAH (RBB), slip op. at 17–
18 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005).
19
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200 JAH (RBB), 2008 WL
878910, at *6, *14 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008).
20
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The
Federal Circuit initially ruled on this case earlier. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs.,
581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). When Mayo appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, the Court
remanded the case to the Federal Circuit in view of the recently decided Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218. The
decision did not change the Federal Circuit’s view of the claims. See supra text accompanying notes 13–
14 for an explanation of the machine-or-transformation test.
21
Prometheus, 628 F.3d at 1355.
22
Id.
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likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause
harm.”23 Accordingly, the Supreme Court framed the question by asking:
“[D]o the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to
allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that
apply natural laws?”24
Relying on an examination of each of the claimed limitations, the
Supreme Court answered its own question in the negative. The Court
concluded that none of the limitations individually or in combination were
“sufficient to transform the nature of the claim.”25 The decision first
examined the “administering” step. According to the Court, this step simply
limited the use of the correlation to the relevant audience: doctors. Since
limiting the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment
cannot circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas, that step
did not render the claims patentable.26 Second, the Court examined the
“wherein” limitations. The Court characterized these limitations as “simply
tell[ing] a doctor about the relevant natural laws, at most adding a
suggestion that he should take those laws into account when treating his
patient.”27 Apparently, it was so clear that these limitations could not
change an unpatentable concept into a patentable application that the
decision said nothing more. The decision then turned to the “determining”
step. This step was well known in the prior art. Since conventional or
obvious presolution activity is not normally sufficient to transform an
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application, the Court
disregarded this step as well.28
The Court’s analysis culminated with the conclusion “that the steps are
not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable
applications of those regularities.”29 Thus, the Supreme Court held that three
types of limitations do not make an unpatentable idea patent eligible:
(1) limiting an unpatentable concept to a particular audience, (2) telling
someone about the concept, or (3) adding a conventional or obvious
presolution activity.
The Mayo decision then pursued three additional lines of analysis that
ostensibly corroborated its conclusion. First, the Court compared the
Prometheus patent to the patents in Parker v. Flook30 and Diamond v.

23

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2012).
Id. at 1297. The correlation is the relationship between 230 pmol to 400 pmol per 8 x 108 red
blood cells level of 6-thioguanine in the blood and the indicated drug dose adjustment.
25
Id.
26
Id. (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010)).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 1297–98.
29
Id. at 1298.
30
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
24
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Diehr.31 In Flook, the claims involved a new formula for calculating an
alarm limit for a catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. The
claimed process contained three steps: “an initial step which merely
measures the present value of the process variable (e.g., the temperature);
an intermediate step which uses an algorithm to calculate an updated alarmlimit value; and a final step in which the actual alarm limit is adjusted to the
updated value.”32 The Supreme Court found that Flook’s invention was not
patent eligible “because once [the] algorithm is assumed to be within the
prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable
invention.”33 Thus, under Flook, the claim’s point of novelty cannot be
based on an unpatentable concept like a mathematical equation.
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided Diehr. Like Flook, the
Diehr patent also involved a mathematical equation. This time the equation
was used in a process for molding and curing raw rubber into products. The
claims added the steps of “installing rubber in a press, closing the mold,
constantly determining the temperature of the mold, constantly
recalculating the appropriate cure time through the use of the formula and a
digital computer, and automatically opening the press at the proper time.”34
Notably, the Court appeared to reject Flook’s approach by saying that “[i]t
is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to
ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.”35 However, the
Diehr Court never explicitly overruled Flook. In the end, the Supreme
Court held that Diehr’s invention was patent eligible because the Court did
“not view [the] claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but
rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber
products.”36
Even the Mayo Court had difficulty understanding why the additional
steps in Diehr rendered its claims patent eligible, noting that “[t]hese other
steps apparently added to the formula something that in terms of patent
law’s objectives had significance.”37 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
never identified the “something” nor what “significance” that something
had. Perhaps this confusion lies in the Court’s failure to acknowledge that
Flook and Diehr are simply irreconcilable.38 However, the Supreme Court
31

450 U.S. 175 (1981).
Flook, 437 U.S. at 585 (footnote omitted).
33
Id. at 594.
34
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
35
Id. at 188; see also Lemley, supra note 6, at 1278 (stating that the Diehr decision repudiated the
point-of-novelty approach applied in Flook).
36
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192–93.
37
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2012) (emphasis
added).
38
See Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 349 (2007) (“Flook and
Diehr are difficult to reconcile.”); Horacio E. Gutiérrez, Peering Through the Cloud: The Future of
Intellectual Property and Computing, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 589, 590 (2011) (noting that Diehr and Flook
32
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still seems to believe that these two decisions provide understandable
guideposts; it concluded that Prometheus’ claims “present[ed] a case for
patentability that is weaker than the (patent-eligible) claim in Diehr and no
stronger than the (unpatentable) claim in Flook.”39 But that discussion is
unhelpful given the confusion about Flook and Diehr. Until the Court
provides a framework for explaining why certain types of limitations can
transform an otherwise unpatentable concept into a patent-eligible claim,
determinations of patentable subject matter will continue to be
unpredictable.
The Supreme Court next engaged in a second line of corroborating
analysis. The Court noted that precedent has firmly established that “simply
appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, to laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot make those laws,
phenomena, and ideas patentable.”40 Indeed, several decisions say that
adding insignificant postsolution limitations does not make an abstract idea
patentable.41 But these decisions do not explain how to distinguish a
limitation directed at postsolution activity from one directed at the solution
itself. Mayo compared the addition of very general limitations to a claim
that simply says “apply the algorithm.” This might suggest that adding
specific limitations would have rendered Prometheus’ claims patentable.
However, those claims already had a great deal of specificity. A change in
dose was indicated if the level of 6-thioguanine strays from a range of 230
pmol to 400 pmol per 8 x 108 red blood cells. Thus, this line of analysis
could be interpreted as either disingenuous or the application of a standard
akin to obscenity: The Court knows it when it sees it.
Finally, the Supreme Court expressed concern “that patent law not
inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of
nature.”42 The concern with overbroad claims is firmly rooted in subjectmatter patentability jurisprudence,43 and several commentators have
suggested that it should be the sole basis for assessing subject matter
patentability decisions.44 As interpreted by the district court, Prometheus’
claims served to “tie up the doctor’s subsequent treatment decision whether
had “very similar facts” with opposite results); Lemley, supra note 6, at 1278 (characterizing the claims
in Diehr and Flook as “exactly parallel”).
39
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299.
40
Id. at 1300.
41
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92; Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
42
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301.
43
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (Douglas, J.) (noting that the claims before it were
“so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the [mathematical formula]”);
see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (“Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of
this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”).
44
Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1341 (proposing five factors for a scope-based § 101
determination).
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that treatment does, or does not, change in light of the inference he has
drawn using the correlations.”45 Thus, the Court said that the fact that
Prometheus’ patents “tie up too much future use of laws of nature simply
reinforces our conclusion that the processes described in the patents are not
patent eligible.”46
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has created panic in the patent
world. By failing to provide a framework for determining when additional
limitations can change an unpatentable concept into a patentable
application, Mayo has created a kind of pessimistic uncertainty.47 Moreover,
by discussing so many ways to reject a patent under § 101, the decision
provides defendants an opportunity to latch onto one of these arguments to
raise a patentable subject matter defense against a host of different kinds of
patents.48 Almost all patents involve unpatentable concepts. Biological and
pharmaceutical inventions inevitably involve natural phenomena.49 Many
current patents involve the application of equations to a new problem using
a computer, just as they did in Flook and Diehr.50 Moreover, almost any
claim can be characterized as too broad depending on how the concept is
defined.51 The fear is that Mayo has opened a Pandora’s Box of patentable
subject matter defenses.
I believe these fears are unwarranted. After all, the Court recognized
that “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”52 Moreover, the
decision clearly suggested that some types of limitations could add
45

Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302.
Id.
47
See supra notes 2–3.
48
See Michel Barclay, Medical Diagnostic Processes Not Patentable, IPDUCK (Mar. 20, 2012, 5:03
PM), http://ipduck.blogspot.com/2012/03/medical-diagnostic-processes-not.html (“Other cases dealing
with §101 involve adding conventional things such as a computer to abstract concepts such as
advertising, and those patents will be highly suspect in the future as well.”); Tony Dutra, Computer,
Medical Diagnostics, Gene Patents at Risk in Light of Mayo, Panelists Contend, PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.bna.com/computer-medical-diagnostics-n1288490881
2/ (“[Intel’s Tina] Chappell predicted that the court would view the algorithms that are typically cited in
software patents in the same way that it analyzed the law of nature in medical diagnostics in Mayo.”).
49
See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (holding that patents to “isolated” human genes associated with a predisposition to breast
cancer and ovarian cancer were patent eligible under § 101), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). The Supreme Court immediately vacated
this decision after Mayo and remanded it to the Federal Circuit for further consideration.
50
See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom.
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012). The Federal Circuit held that a method
for distributing Internet content was patent eligible under § 101. On May 21, 2012, the Supreme Court
vacated this decision and remanded it to the Federal Circuit for further consideration in light of Mayo.
WildTangent, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2431.
51
See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV.
1353, 1369–71 (explaining how claims can be viewed at different levels of abstraction).
52
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
46
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“enough” to an unpatentable concept to make it patent eligible. Thus, the
problem with Mayo was not that it radically constricted patentable subject
matter. Rather, the problem was that Mayo failed to explain how to separate
unpatentable concepts from patentable applications of those concepts.
Reviving the out-of-favor point-of-novelty analysis would bring order
to this doctrinal chaos and provide a more coherent framework for making
patentable subject matter determinations. Interestingly, the Mayo decision is
already unconsciously littered with point-of-novelty concepts. Thus, the
advantage of the framework proposed below is that it builds on current
jurisprudence. In fact, this framework also uses the existing (but heavily
criticized) machine-or-transformation test.53 In sum, the recommendations
offer a realistic and practical adjustment to the law, not an idealized view of
what the law should be. In so doing, they show that Mayo can be
understood, under the proposed point-of-novelty framework, as a modest
rejection of a particular type of abstract claim rather than a fundamental
change to patentable subject matter doctrine.
III. THE POINT OF NOVELTY IN PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
For decades, courts have refused to consider the point of novelty in
making decisions in patent law. Under this view, the law should not
attribute any special significance to a subset of claim limitations regardless
of how important those limitations are to the invention; the law treats all the
limitations as equally important. This principle can trace its roots to at least
as far back as Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co.,54 when the Supreme Court refused to consider the point of novelty in
determining whether an item was permissibly repaired or improperly
reconstructed. This principle has become one of the basic “commandments”
of patent law and has affected many of its doctrines, including patentable
subject matter.55
In separate works, Mark Lemley and I have recently called this view
into question.56 As Lemley puts it, “a patent regime that pays attention to
what the patentee actually invented, not what the patent lawyer wrote down,
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Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1338 (discussing the failures of the machine-or-transformation

test).
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365 U.S. 336 (1961).
Chao, supra note 6, at 1192–94 (explaining how patent law refuses to consider the heart of the
invention—or, as Lemley calls it, the point of novelty—in the context of infringement, anticipation,
obviousness, and the written description requirement).
56
Id. at 1240 (“[I]t is time to . . . explicitly recognize that the heart of the invention has its place in
patent law.”); Lemley, supra note 6, at 1255 (“[P]atent law would be better off focusing on the point of
novelty in evaluating inventions.”); see also Kevin Emerson Collins, Getting Into the “Spirit” of
Innovative Things: Looking to Complementary and Substitute Properties to Shape Patent Protection for
Improvements, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1237 (2011) (arguing that the failure to consider the
point of novelty is “highly problematic in the context of patent protection for improvements”).
55
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is more likely to achieve the goal of promoting innovation.”57 Although
Lemley and I both criticize patent law’s failure to consider the point of
novelty in a wide-ranging number of doctrines, Lemley has been critical of
applying point-of-novelty analysis in subject matter patentability
determinations.
Lemley is concerned that applying a point-of-novelty analysis in this
context will return us “to the bad old days of restrictive patentable subject
matter eligibility.”58 By that, Lemley is referring to Parker v. Flook. In
Flook, the Supreme Court noted that the patent’s point of novelty was a
mathematical algorithm. Since mathematical algorithms are not patentable,
the Supreme Court concluded that the patent was invalid under § 101.
Under this reasoning, any patent that was based on an unpatentable concept
was not patent eligible. It did not matter what additional limitations were
added. Of course that would mean that applications of unpatentable
concepts are also not patentable. Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, and R.
Polk Wagner have all joined with Lemley in criticizing Flook’s point-ofnovelty methodology.59 To some extent, I agree with these critics. Flook
improperly focused on the point of novelty to the exclusion of all of the
other claim limitations. That methodology makes no sense because many
inventions involve the application of an unpatentable abstract idea or
natural phenomenon. Indeed, the Mayo decision recognized that, to assess
whether a claim is properly directed at an application (as opposed to just
the unpatentable concept), courts must consider those other claim
limitations.60 In other words, under the approach the Supreme Court has
already adopted in Mayo, a court must examine limitations that are not at
the invention’s point of novelty.
But the particular point-of-novelty analysis approach outlined by Flook
was short lived.61 Under Diehr, the “claims must be considered as a whole,”
it being “inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and
then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.”62 So when
Mayo Labs focused on the limitations that covered the correlation between
metabolite levels and drug doses, Prometheus responded that Mayo Labs
was improperly considering the point of novelty.63 Prometheus argued that
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Lemley, supra note 6, at 1255.
Id. at 1278.
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Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1335 (arguing that the problem with Flook was “its apparent
reliance on ‘point of novelty’ analysis”).
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Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
61
Brief for the Respondent at 1, 18, 29, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150); Lemley et al., supra
note 16, at 1335–36 (saying Diehr “essentially overruled” Flook’s holding on the point of novelty).
62
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
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Brief for the Respondent, supra note 61.
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it did not matter what the point of novelty was because the administering
and determining steps made its claims patent eligible.64
Although Diehr certainly took a step back from Flook, it was not a
wholesale rejection of point-of-novelty analysis. Quite the contrary, Diehr
also noted that “insignificant postsolution activity will not transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.”65 Analyzing what is or is
not “insignificant postsolution activity” requires identifying the claim’s
point of novelty. Indeed, the Mayo decision has broadly interpreted this
concept to encompass limitations that are not central to the point of novelty
regardless of when they take place.66 Thus, without explicitly holding that
point-of-novelty analysis should be considered when analyzing patentable
subject matter, the Supreme Court has called for precisely this kind of
analysis in both Diehr and Mayo.67
Unfortunately, these decisions do not explain how to consider a claim
“as a whole” while simultaneously discounting limitations that are not
strongly related to the point of novelty. Yet it is possible that these two
seemingly contradictory requirements can be satisfied. In particular,
applying a point-of-novelty approach to subject matter patentability can be
divided into two parts. First, the limitation—or limitations68—that embody
the point of novelty must be identified to determine whether it only
describes an unpatentable concept. Those concepts could be laws of nature
(e.g., Mayo), physical phenomena, or abstract ideas. As Mayo recognizes,
this approach requires that courts view evidence of prior art as part of the
patentable subject matter analysis.69 This may not be an easy task.70 But the
current doctrine of patentable subject matter is already considered one of
the most costly and complex.71 At least when a point-of-novelty approach is
64

Id. at 32–34.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92. The Supreme Court recently reiterated this view in Bilski v. Kappos.
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (“Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or
adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable.”); see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct.
at 1293–94.
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Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298 (discussing conventional or obvious presolution activity); see also In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (noting that the Court’s reasoning on
“postsolution” activity “is equally applicable to any insignificant extra-solution activity regardless of
where and when it appears in the claimed process”), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
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See Chao, supra note 6, at 1192 (explaining how courts often use a point-of-novelty analysis
using different language).
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The point of novelty may be embodied in more than one limitation. For the purposes of
simplicity, this Essay uses the singular.
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Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98 (referring to the “determining” step as “conventional activity
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Collins, supra note 56, at 1237 (“Identifying the ‘spirit’ of an invention is an informationintensive and error-prone exercise. It takes work to identify the one or more ways in which a patented
invention differs from the prior art.”).
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See Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent
Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673 (2010).
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explicitly applied to Prometheus’ claims below, the analysis proves far
simpler.
This Essay proposes a new point-of-novelty analysis for determining
whether a patent is eligible under § 101. The proposal first determines
whether any limitation covers an unpatentable concept. This can be
accomplished using existing analytical tools. For example, the court could
determine if the limitation satisfies the machine-or-transformation test.72 If
the limitation embodying the point of novelty does not describe an
unpatentable concept, the claim qualifies as patentable subject matter. If the
limitation embodying the point of novelty merely describes one of these
unpatentable concepts, the court should proceed to the second part of the
analysis—examining the other limitations.
If the other limitations are not directed at an unpatentable concept and
have a strong nexus with the point of novelty, the claim is patentable. The
nexus requirement excludes “insignificant postsolution activity” and other
limitations that are not central to the point of novelty. Moreover, it requires
courts to judge how important these other limitations are to the point of
novelty. If they are not, these additional limitations cannot render an
unpatentable concept patent eligible. Notably, this approach does not
require that the other limitations be novel themselves.
This approach follows the requirements set forth in Diehr and Mayo. It
does not examine the limitation representing the point of novelty in total
isolation as the Court did in Flook. Rather, it considers the point of novelty
in the context of the claim as a whole. By accounting for the possibility that
“other” limitations will demonstrate that the claim is directed toward a
patentable application of an unpatentable concept, this approach closely
follows the Mayo decision. Moreover, it should address Lemley’s concerns
about the prior point-of-novelty analysis.
To illustrate how this approach works, Part IV analyzes two variations
of Prometheus’ claims. Specifically, it looks both at the claims Prometheus
drafted and at the hypothetical claims it could have drafted. Applying the
point-of-novelty analysis described above, I conclude that Prometheus
could have received claims that are patentable. But I also find that the
claims that it actually received do not qualify as patentable subject matter.
IV. EXAMINING PROMETHEUS’ POINT OF NOVELTY
A. The Claims that Could Have Been
As mentioned earlier, neither claim 1 of the ’623 patent nor any of
Prometheus’ other claims contain the expected third step of adjusting the

72

The machine-or-transformation test is an important clue to determine whether a process qualifies
as patentable subject matter. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010).
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drug dose according to the indicated parameters. Prometheus could have
easily replaced the two “wherein” clauses with the following language:
when the level of 6-thioguanine is determined to be less than about 230 pmol
per 8x108 red blood cells, increasing the amount of said drug subsequently
administered to said subject and
when the level of 6-thioguanine is determined to be greater than about 400
pmol per 8x108 red blood cells, decreasing the amount of said drug
subsequently administered to said subject

Analyzing this hypothetical claim serves two purposes. First, if the
claim is both patentable and enforceable,73 then the Mayo decision will not
upset patent law in the way so many foresee. In other words, deciding that
the claims as drafted are not drawn to patentable subject matter does not
undercut the entire medical diagnostic industry. Such a result merely
requires its attorneys to draft more concrete claims. Although those claims
may be somewhat narrower, they should still allow the industry to cover the
way treatments change in response to particular tests. Second, the
hypothetical claim illustrates how the point-of-novelty approach would
handle a claim that appears patentable.
Under the point-of-novelty approach outlined above, such a claim
would be patentable. According to the Supreme Court, the inventors
discovered a law of nature—namely, the specific correlation between the
levels of metabolized drug in the body and the optimal drug dosage. The
point of novelty is found in the new “increasing” and “decreasing”
limitations outlined above. However, these limitations do not only describe
an unpatentable concept. Rather, they are also directed to a concrete
application—changing drug doses. This characterization can be confirmed
by applying the machine-or-transformation test to the limitations. Since the
two steps either increase or decrease drug doses, they satisfy the test by
transforming the human body.
Of course, the point-of-novelty approach only confirms what everyone
thought they knew before Mayo—a hypothetical claim that contained a final
dose-adjusting step would be patentable.74 Naturally, this raises questions
concerning the reasons why Prometheus failed to draft its claims with this
kind of limitation. When Justice Kagan asked this question, Prometheus’
counsel said that such a limitation “doesn’t correspond with how doctors
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The issue of enforcement relates to a question of divided infringement discussed infra notes 77–
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, 47, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150). During oral
argument, both parties were asked about such a hypothetical claim, and they both answered that it would
be patentable. In an unscientific experiment, I provided the same hypothetical claim to my patent class
and asked them to apply the Mayo decision and assess whether the claim was patent eligible. There were
six groups of three. Each group was given twenty-four hours to provide their answer. Four out of the six
groups found that the new claim remained unpatentable.
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practice medicine.”75 Based on the patient’s condition, a doctor may decide
to tolerate higher or lower levels of the metabolite before adjusting the
dose.76 Apparently, Prometheus believed that adding an adjusting step
would not allow it to capture the conduct of doctors when they varied from
the parameters specified in the claim. But this concern was already
addressed by the “about” limitation included in the drafted claims. Even if
that safeguard was not adequate, Prometheus could have included a broader
range in its claims.
In its amicus brief, the Solicitor General suggested that Prometheus
may have omitted the final adjusting step to avoid a different issue—the
problem of divided infringement.77 There is no direct infringement of a
method claim unless “one party exercises ‘control or direction’ over the
entire process such that every step is attributable to the controlling party.”78
If Prometheus had included the final adjusting step in its claims, Mayo Labs
could have pointed out that, while they performed some of the steps, other
steps were performed by doctors. Unless the doctors controlled or directed
Mayo Labs—or Mayo Labs controlled or directed the doctors—there could
be no infringement.
However, this explanation does not justify the omission of a final
adjusting step. Although the hypothetical claim could certainly face a
problem of divided infringement, the same is true for the actual claims
found in the Prometheus patents. Presumably, doctors are responsible for
the first step of administering the drug and the final step of being warned
about the correlation between the metabolite levels and any indicated
adjustment. However, diagnostic laboratories are likely to perform the
second step of determining the metabolite levels. Again, unless one party is
controlling or directing the other, there can be no direct infringement.79 Of
course, adding a concrete final adjusting step may exacerbate the divided
infringement issue because different doctors may perform the original
administering step and the final adjusting step. But that seems to be a
problem that the jurisprudence on divided infringement needs to address.80
The outcome of a determination on patentable subject matter should not
turn on whether adding a limitation aggravates a divided infringement issue.
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Id. at 48.
Id. at 48–49.
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Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 31, Mayo, 132 S. Ct.
1289 (No. 10-1150).
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Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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In fact, since the original version of this Essay was published, an en banc panel of the Federal
Circuit reviewed the issue of divided infringement in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks,
Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
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B. The Claims as Drafted
Consider next the application of the point-of-novelty analysis to the
claims Prometheus actually obtained. Initially, this approach looks quite
similar to the approach the Supreme Court first took in Mayo. Again, the
first part of the analysis requires a court to identify the limitation or
limitations that correspond to the point of novelty. There are two important
facts that inform the analysis of Prometheus’ claims. First, the
administering and determining steps are found in the prior art. Thus, those
two steps do not lie at the point of novelty. Second, the inventors are
credited with discovering the specific correlation between the levels of
metabolized drug in the body and the optimal drug dosage. The two
“wherein” clauses correspond to that discovery. Therefore, these two
limitations embody the point of novelty.
Next a court must determine whether these limitations describe an
unpatentable concept. Again, the Mayo decision informs us that the
limitations involve an unpatentable law of nature—the specific correlation
between the levels of metabolized drug in the body and the optimal drug
dosage. Applying the proposed test, there is nothing within the limitations
that would suggest that they cover an application. The two limitations
simply require that a doctor recognize the correlation between a particular
metabolite level and how to adjust the dose. Certainly, recognizing the
correlation does not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test. By itself,
the doctor’s recognition is not tied to a machine, nor does it transform
anything. Consequently, the “wherein” limitations are directed to
unpatentable concepts, and the point-of-novelty analysis should proceed.
The second part of the point-of-novelty analysis requires an
examination of the other limitations. If they are not directed at an
unpatentable concept and have a strong nexus with the point of novelty, the
claim is patentable. Here, those limitations are the steps of administering a
drug containing 6-thioguanine and determining the levels of 6-thioguanine
found in the patient’s blood. Those steps clearly are not directed at an
unpatentable concept. Indeed, the underlying Federal Circuit decision relied
on these steps to show that they satisfy the machine-or-transformation test.81
However, to render the claim patentable, these limitations must also
have a sufficiently strong nexus with the point of novelty. But
understanding the specific correlation between the levels of metabolized
drug in the body and the optimal drug dosage does not affect the
administering and determining steps. Unlike the patents in Flook and Diehr,
there is nothing about the point of novelty that changes how those other
steps are performed. Therefore, the administering and determining steps are
not sufficiently related to the point of novelty to make Prometheus’ claims
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patent eligible under § 101.82 Thus, the point-of-novelty analysis outlined
above arrives at the same conclusion that the Supreme Court actually
reached in Mayo—that Prometheus’ claims are not patent eligible.
The point-of-novelty framework offered here builds on some important
concepts that are already found in Mayo. In Mayo, the Supreme Court
understood that adding some limitations to laws of nature, physical
phenomena, or abstract ideas could render a claim patentable. The Court
also understood that certain kinds of limitations would not suffice. Limiting
an unpatentable concept to a particular audience, telling someone about the
concept, or adding a conventional or obvious pre- or postsolution activity
would not change the nature of an unpatentable concept. What was missing
from Mayo (and Supreme Court jurisprudence in general) was a framework
that tied these different strands together.
The revised point-of-novelty approach serves this purpose. Assuming
that the point of novelty is an unpatentable concept, this approach explains
what types of additional limitations will render the concept patentable.
Under this approach, concrete limitations that have a strong nexus with the
unpatentable concept can make the concept patent eligible. In other words,
if the additional limitations are not sufficiently concrete (e.g., understanding
the concept or telling someone about the concept), or if the limitations are
not strongly linked to the concept (e.g., limiting a patent to a particular
audience), they cannot make a law of nature, physical phenomenon, or
abstract idea patent eligible.
At the same time, the point-of-novelty framework rejects much of
Mayo’s dicta.83 This framework does not care how broadly the claim sweeps
(as some advocate).84 Nor does it try to reconcile Flook and Diehr. Indeed,
under the point-of-novelty analysis outlined here, Flook was probably
decided incorrectly because the additional limitations describing a catalytic
chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were both concrete and strongly
linked to Flook’s formula.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the proposed point-of-novelty
framework does not jeopardize a broad swath of medical, pharmaceutical,
and technology patents. By explaining precisely what types of limitations
must be added to an unpatentable concept, the point-of-novelty framework
removes much of the uncertainty that surrounds Mayo. Moreover, the
82
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83
The analyses comparing Prometheus’ claims to those in Flook and Diehr and discussing the
scope of preemption were both said to “reinforce” the Court’s conclusion. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298, 1302 (2012). Therefore, they are both technically dicta.
84
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Prometheus hypothetical and Flook example show that most patents should
be found to be patent eligible under this framework. The only reason
Prometheus’ patents failed this test was because they claimed a law of
nature without adding any concrete steps that had a strong nexus with the
discovery they made—a mistake that could have easily been avoided.
CONCLUSION
In Mayo, the Supreme Court held that the limitations found in
Prometheus’ claims did not add “enough” to the law of nature Prometheus
discovered to render that discovery patent eligible. Unfortunately, the
Court’s failure to explain what might be “enough” casts doubt on many
patents that have properly been considered patent eligible. Many
commentators fear that Mayo marks a fundamental shift in subject matter
patentability jurisprudence that may radically limit patents. This Essay
offers a more restrained view of Mayo by reviving the out-of-favor pointof-novelty analysis. Importantly, Mayo already contains the seeds of this
revival. Thus, the current proposal does not reject Mayo, but builds on it.
When a patent’s point of novelty is based on a law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea, this proposal defines what types of
limitations can transform the unpatentable concept into a patentable
application of the concept. That occurs when the additional limitations are
concrete and have a strong nexus to the unpatentable concept.
This proposal achieves two goals. First, it maintains patent eligibility
for many medical, pharmaceutical, and technology patents that might be
jeopardized by a less nuanced reading of Mayo. Second, the point-ofnovelty framework creates clearer boundaries between claims covering
unpatentable concepts—like Prometheus’ claims—and claims directed at
patentable applications of those concepts. In sum, if and when Mayo is
understood as the initial step toward a point-of-novelty framework for
patentable subject matter, it will not create the havoc that so many fear.
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